DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNICATION IN LEVINAS & DEWEY

Deliberative democracy has become normative terminology within the study of philosophical, political and social science. However, this concept can vary based on the specific theory it is associated with, and while there is typically the associated goal or aim of improved means of achieving justice and security for the public, the ethics of deliberative democracy are continually subject to debate. In considering the ethical nature of deliberation within the political and public realms, it is worthwhile to turn to John Dewey and Emanuel Levinas, and to examine the intersection of their respective conceptualizations of communication as a method for achieving ethical systems.

Modern and contemporary ideas of deliberation within a democratic political system originate in part from Habermas, who was interested in the methodology of deliberation as a way to capture the “totality of society” (Habermas 1992). He addresses the procedural aspects of deliberation and describes his considerations of ideal speech. The role of the state, he thought, was to ensure appropriate discourse and deliberation and to legitimize this through institutional rules and legalities. Kapoor argues that this “coercion free deliberative-sphere” is bound to be unsuccessful if the aim is to capture a politically driven consensus; in such a format the only natural outcome is that some groups are inherently excluded (2002: 464). Mouffe offers a detailed critique of Habermas, writing that deliberative democracy does not address the needs of individuals adequately, and that deliberation for the attainment of a consensus will always result in some form of exclusion (Mouffe 1999). According to Simon and Sulkin, deliberation and communication are synonymous, although it is unlikely that either Dewey or Levinas would be in full agreement with such a claim, while it is, of course, a necessity for any type of communicative action to be effective in improving justice and ethics within a society (Kahn & Schneiderhan 2008: 6).

Political discussion is a key part of Dewey’s theory, however not the entirety of his ethical theory (Ralston 2010). While communication and collaboration he determines as necessities, Dewey maintains that these need supportive structures and institutions in which they can occur and be safeguarded. The question does arise, in reading Dewey, of the likelihood and feasibility of institutionalizing deliberation (Bohman 2004). How does one institutionalize and consequently mandate communication of the public? How is the entirety of the public represented in this communication, and would one venture to ensure collaboration between many varied and at times potentially disparate parts of the public whole? Dewey envisions cooperative social activity as a mechanism for having a dialogue which encompasses not only the majority, but other separate distinct entities and individuals which make up unique parts of the whole. “Majoritarianism” is not a solution for ensuring the individual needs of a population and will only have a benefit for those who identify with the largest collective; a “just and harmonious social life” will not be attainable in the prioritization of the majority will (Freeman 2000). 

While Dewey is an advocate for discourse and communication, reading Dewey does not call to mind deliberation in the sense of the classical Greek orators or Roman senators in the forum, deliberating which is the correct choice out of a variety of options. The deliberation that Dewey writes of is not evocative of overly impassioned debate between two distinct standpoints. Rather, one gets the general sense in reading him that he is an advocate for a localized communal life. He is wary of large groups of people making decisions together on behalf of the collective, as “human beings may lose their identity in a mob or in a political convention” (Dewey 1984: 49). The collective will is far too impersonal and it fails to attend to the needs of the individual. According to Dewey in The Public and Its Problems, a critical component of what the public should provide for is “systematic care” whereby officials within state organizations and institutions look out for and take care of the interests of the public. With this, Dewey rejects the notion of a wholly unified public; the public is naturally a space of differentiation, and the general public has no fixed identity. The systematic care is, therefore, the concept of taking care of needs on an individual basis, without exclusion. The voice of the pluralistic public coalesces into state power, and the state acts in an administrative capacity for the public, whereby the state’s responsibility is to address the “developing needs that require systematic care” (Dewey 1984: 27). He believes a shift from the impersonal nature of Great Society must be replaced by a more meaningful and personal Great Community. For Dewey, “consultation and discussion” are requisites to “uncover social needs and troubles” (Dewey 1984: 154). He continues that the “essential need...is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion...that is the problem of the public” (Dewey 1984: 155). 

For Levinas, his approach to ethics is similar to Dewey’s in that it requires interaction and communication on an individual and localized scale. Levinas uses Dostoevsky’s sentiment that we as humans are responsible for everything and everyone; responsibility is, therefore, the essential and primary element of an ethical society. According to Levinas, consciousness of Self is synonymous with consciousness of all. Governance should thus stem from the approach to ethics whereby the Self is subjected to the Other (Levinas 1961: 212). What occurs “between us, concerns everyone” he writes, and there exists the obligation of the Self in infinite responsibility to the Other. Levinas amends Buber’s claim of I-Thou relationships between individuals, which do not serve to create conditions for adequate responsibility toward the Other, and instead he proposes a “for-the-Other” approach (Robbins 2001: 213). Levinas deems that “...one’s responsibility for the Other comes prior to one’s freedom...” and state institutions and methods of governance should be structured to ensure and prioritize such (Sugarman 2013: 39). 

Democracy, in terms of Levinas’ ethics, would work if the state institutions provided for the individualized needs of the Other, in much the same way that Dewey calls for. Levinas’ necessity of the face-to-face communication between the Self and the Other is essential as “the epiphany of the face is ethical” (1961: 199). Sugarman writes that “for Levinas, equality is discovered in the ordering of justice” (2013: 21). Therefore, any state system must be dedicated to ensuring the ability of any individual to seek justice, with a requirement of communication “...face-to-face in local deliberative fora” (Hayward 2011: 469). Levinas, like Dewey, acknowledges the individuality and uniqueness which must be acknowledged and which is natural to humanity. Humans are unified in that there is a belonging to one genus, however humans do not operate in the world merely as a part of the collective whole (Levinas 1991). Humans have unique autonomy separate from the whole; to ignore this principle is unethical and denies the uniqueness of the Other. Both Dewey and Levinas see state institutions as having the possibility and potential to balance and support the responsibility of the individual Others within the public sphere. 

Democracy for Dewey must be inclusive, just as ethics for Levinas encompasses the whole of humanity. “Local town meeting practices and ideas” must be maintained through cooperative means (Dewey 1984: 19). Dewey describes that society has a “complex horizon of value and meaning” which requires a method of decision-making requiring data from the whole as opposed to data of only a select few. Similarly, Levinas uses the word “horizon” to illustrate the expansiveness of the Self’s responsibility to the Other. It is not merely those closest to the Self - family and friends for example - who require and command responsibility from the Self, it is any Other that the Self is called to be in service to. The notion of deliberative democracy may exist in modernity as a tool for inhibiting domination, if one considers freedom to be nondomination; however the structure of political institutions and governing entities need not only acknowledge differences, but also accommodate for the individual (Hayward 2011). “Collective ends and means” writes Hayward, cannot be prioritized above the individual for the sake of efficiency (2011: 490). 

The inherent pluralism and multiplicity of society makes it impossible for goals of justice to be achieved through debate; it is not a question of right or wrong, the question of ethics should instead be framed as what is it that the Other needs or requires? Bächtiger, et al. describe two types of deliberative processes which they qualify as necessarily interactive and communicative for the aim of metaconsensus. Type I is the route of rational discourse and procedural process, inclusive of an intersubjective rationality. Type II requires “deliberation which includes alternative forms of communication and takes a prime focus on deliberative institutions and outcomes” (Bächtiger, et al. 2010: 58). While perhaps not fully in alignment with Levinasian ethics, the attention to the outcome and the procedural component of social interaction may accommodate for the face-to-face which Levinas deems as requisite for true attainment and comprehension of ethics. Deliberation within a democracy requires communication that, according to both Levinas and Dewey, can be assisted by state infrastructure and institutions. 

While used with varying denotations and connotations today, deliberation is not the sole characteristic which will ensure an ethical democracy for either Levinas or Dewey. Communication they both viewed as a required function for comprehending the needs of all Others and individuals. Without communication that takes into account individual needs, systematic care remains unrealized as the public integrates into a majoritarian collective, excluding individuals who diverge from it. Communication on an individual and local level, which may take shape as deliberation, discussion, or debate - is necessary to avoid the risk of an unethical system which only prioritizes the care and needs of the public majority. 

Bibliography

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